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SLAVERY IN AFRICA
Richard Rathbone
The almost casual concern of African specialists with a question
of such significance as the social consequences of the slave
trade on African societies appears at first sight rather
surprising. While this problem is the object of some judgement
or other in most regional or general treatments of African
history that extend to the period of the trade, it has
attracted far less attention in the monographic literature.
Even more surprising is the fact that despite the wide range of
historical assessments made by various scholars, there has been
little direct confrontation of opposing views. The brief -
and generally inconclusive - exchanges between Walter Rodney
(1966) and John Fage (1959;1969;1975) and between Fage and
Wrigley (1971) seem rather to underline this observation than
to contradict it. ,
Whatever the sources of this lacuna might be, they are certain-
ly fed by the generally speculative way in which the issue has
been pursued and, more seriously, the absence of any sound
theoretical framework within which the weighing of evidence and
testing of hypotheses can proceed. In this paper I propose to
examine the principal contributions to this discussion with a
view to assessing how the debate on this important question
could be most fruitfully pursued, and to raise a few suggestions
with regard to the strengthening of the theoretical foundations
of the debate.
— 2 —
The Conflicting Views
A convenient summary of the established view of the slave trade,
until the early 1960's, is offered by Andrew Kamarck:
It drew off from the continent human beings
at the most productive ages. Worse still,
it encouraged tribe to fight tribe and
encouraged conflict within tribes. Finally,
and perhaps most important, any advantages
that Africa derived from contact with the
rest of the world - the learning of some
skills, the introduction of new foods, such
as maize and manioc - vere more than offset
by the salve trade plunging vast stretches
of Africa into anarchy.
{The Economics of African Development,
quoted in Markowitz, 1977, p.147)
Basil Davidson, respectful of empirical data and more sensitive
to the ambiguities of historical development, accepts that
'depopulation was seldom a primary social factor of the oversea
trade' but concurs that '....in spite of an undoubted improve-
ment in food supplies .... there can be no doubt that on balance
the economic effects of the European contact worked steady and
decisive damage .... the slave trade exercised a serious and
continuing effect in retarding and reducing African production'.
(Davidson, 1961, pp. 238-41). Much the same verdict is
pronounced by Jean Suret-Canale who, despite his acceptance of
a figure in excess of 40 million for the population loss due to
the slave trade, concludes that 'The trade was less serious in
its numerical, demographic consequences, properly speaking,
than in its unforseen economic and social consequences .... the
general retarding influence of the trade seems to us beyond
question.' (Suret-Canale, 1964).
The principle advocate of the contrary proposition is
John Fage. Concentrating upon the existence of the institution
of slavery within West African societies prior to the trade,
the existence of a far more ancient trans-Saharan trade, and the
political dynamics of the region, Fage concludes that the slave
trade may actually have been a factor in strengthening the
emergence of large-scale state structures and hence social
development:
There seems in fact to be a close correlation
in West Africa between economic development
{and political development, because
indigenous commercial activity was largely
king- or state-directed) and the growth of
the institution of slavery as here defined ...
On the whole it is probably true to say that
the operation of the slave trade may have
tended to integrate, strengthen and develop
unitary territorial political authority, but
to weaken or destroy more segmentary societies.
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Whether this was good or evil may be a nice
point; historically it may be seen as
purposive and perhaps as more or less
inevitable.
(Fage, 1969)
Drawing upon the efforts of Philip Curtin to provide firmer
estimates of the numerical dimensions of the trade, Fage
further concludes that the demographic effects of the trade
were strictly limited: 'Two things are at once apparent:
i) this is not an outstandingly high rate of loss; and
ii) it is of much the same order of magnitude as the likely
natural growth rate.
In gross, therefore, the quantitative demographic effect of the
slave trade on the population of West Africa is likely to have
maintained it at an approximately static level over a period of
up to one hundred years.' (Fage, 1975, p.18)
It must be noted that throughout his discussion Fage is at
pains to restrict his remarks to West Africa, acknowledging
that the different economic and social context of the trade in
East and Central Africa may well have made it far more
historically disruptive. While this distinction is empirically
well-founded (indeed it appears to make Page a tougher critic
of the trade in these regions than Davidson and Suret-Canale,
whole abandonment of the depopulation hypothesis was not
regionally specific) it still leaves serious problems in Fage's
chosen terrain of West Africa.
By and large the Fage perspective appears to have taken on
something of the status of a 'new orthodoxy1 with only a few
ripostes to his arguments forthcoming. it may therefore be
worthwhile to take its central propositions as a starting
point and examine them and their opposing counterparts in turn.
The Areas of Contention
1. The Demography of the Trade
It seems unclear why Fage has concentrated so much effort upon
the issue of demographic impact. Even the appearance of
Curtin's estimates does not really introduce a dramatically new
element in the interpretation of the trade: as far back as the
1930's Kuczynski explicitly rejected the wilder estimates in
favour of a figure of 15 million for total slave imports to the
New World. While this is substantially in excess of Curtin's
current figure of 10 million, the difference, over such a long
period and given the immense uncertainty surrounding the
population base from which it was drawn, seems of limited
significance. Moreover, as we have seen, leading advocates of
the opposing view of the trade, such as Davidson and
Suret-Canale, accept that depopulation was not a widespread
consequence of the trade.
At the same time his discussion of demography does not really
engage his opponents on the correct ground: for their case,
while drawing upon a higher initial estimate of slave exports,
rests upon the 'multiplier' of deaths and casualties sustained
in the hunt for slaves. If such a procedure were to be
applied to the lower figure of Curtin/Fage they would still
generate a population loss rate several times in excess of the
natural growth rate. This may or may not be an acceptable
procedure: but it must be refuted, not simply ignored, if
Page's confident assertions about the insignificant demographic
consequences of the trade are to carry conviction.
The fundamental difficulty is of a more basic order, however:
Fage treats demography purely as a statistical and not a social
or theoretical question. His number-juggling thus produces
conclusions which, whatever their veracity, tell us nothing at
the socio-economic level. Fage asserts that 'I cannot see any
evidence that, by and large, the Atlantic slave trade had a
crippling effect on the growth of population in West Africa.1
But what is a century-long stagnation of population and an
historically rather crucial century at that? Obviously if one
assumes that West Africa had attained some idyllic 'natural
balance1 prior to the 18th. century then the slave trade can be
viewed as a felicitous mechanism for preserving it. But on
what basis would such a proposition rest? As
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch argues, even from a slightly more
sophisticated statistical perspective, Fage's picture is one of
'relative depopulation1 in which the continent's demographic
stagnation leads to a decline in its share of world population
from 18-21 per cent in the mid-17th. century to less than 8% by
the early part of this century. (Coquery-Vidrovitch and
Moniot, 1974)
Of course none of this tells us anything about the actual state
of African societies under the impact of the slave trade or
their social dynamics. Did a stable population represent a
force for social stability or one which slapped the "inspiration"
for growth and development?
Moreover serious questions must be raised about the aggregates
which Fage operates with1. Curtin has pointed out that:
For statistics 'sub-Saharan Africa as a whole1
is useful entity, but not for this historical
problem. People did not live in 'Sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole1. They lived in a series
of particular African societies ...
{Curtin, 1969, p.271)
Undoubtedly Fage's conceptualisation of 'West Africa1 is a step
forward, but is it still a meaningful aggregate for the treat-
ment of such a socially variable set of phenomena?
Perhaps more serious is his aggregation of long-period
demographic trends and his treatment of the population as
totally homogenous. The demographic profile of a society is
cnot merely a matter of numbers but incorporates as meaningful
variables such as sex and age composition. The slave trade
was not neutral in its impact upon these. Drawing (throughout
its existence) disproportionately on younger males, the trade
meant that there was a continuing modification of the sex and
age-ratios that would otherwise have existed. While this
might all come out in the statistical wash once the disturbing
factor had been removed and internal population dynamics had
reasserted themselves, the intervening period was lengthy
enough for profound socio-economic consequences to have ensued.
2. Social Consequences of the Trade:
Slavery and State Formation
It would of course be wrong to suggest that Fage ignores the
broader social consequences of the trade. On the contrary,
this is the principal concern of his earlier study. His error
is in detaching demographic issues from their social causes and
consequences, and falling into the trap of believing that
meaningful conclusions about the slave trade can be drawn from
the former alone.
Fage's discussion of the wider social questions reveals both
the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. In his favour
we must set the following points:
1. he looks at the issue of slavery and the slave trade, to
use his own words, 'in the context of West African history',
rather than seeing it purely as a European initiative in
which Africans could do nothing but passively acquiesce;
2. he is prepared to look at historial development in terms of
its real, contradictory course, and not in terms of some
benificent schema;
thus the possibility that social advance may follow the route of
growing social differentiation, oppression and violence is not
excluded a priori (this is what Wrigley castigates as his
1
 historicism1 ) . **""
In these respects Fage appears upon firmer ground than his
critics, who include, curiously, both explicit anti-Marxists
(Wrigley) and Marxists (Davidson, Suret-Canale) . All of these
seem loth to accept that the emergence of slaving, military
artistocracies out of village communities could represent
anything other than a retrograde social development. Wrigley
does so on at least the consistent basis that the affirmation
of liberal values is more important than understanding history
(reducing, en route, the complex upheavals of the southern
Africa mfecane to the actions of 'a raging psychopath', and
concluding by harnessing the horses of the slave trade to the
chariot of the Biafran conflict). Rejecting the notion that
history can be theorised, Wrigley naturally has no theory of
West African social formations, and thus nothing to put in the
place of Fage's analysis. But the perspective of Davidson and
Suret-Canale is really little better: they too lack any
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articulated theory of the social formations under consideration,
and thus insert a minus sign before the slaving regimes purely
on the basis of their repugnanat, repressive character.
On another level, however, Wrigley's accusation of 'historicism'
against Fage does hit home. For what Fage applies to
West African history is not so much a coherent theory {or even
the elements of such a theory) but, as Wrigley says, an
overarching teleo.logical principle - that of 'state formation'.
That is nowhere clearer than in the excerpt we have already
quoted:
There seems to be a- close correlation in
West Africa between economic development
(and political development, because indigenous
commercial activity was largely king- or state-
directed) and the growth of the institution
of slavery ....
Here we have a double movement: the collapsing of the category
of 'economic development1 into that of 'ccmmerical activity'
and the detachment of the large-scale political structures or
states from the social foundations of local agricultural
communities upon which they rested. . Apart from the empirical
problems involved (for example, what becomes of the Niger Delta
city states and their merchant oligarchies or the 'trading
diasporas1 of the Dioula or Hausa?) this procedure is
theoretically fatal. Its foundation seems to lie in the
'formalist' bias of most African economic historians, which
renders them inordinantly blind to the processes at work within
the communities of agricultural producers upon which the edifice
of West African states rested and inordinantly preoccupied with
the market-orientated activities in which state institutions
and state-dependent social strata were predominant.
Its most serious consequence - and one which invades the
interpretation of otherwise very perceptive commentators such
as Hopkins (see Hopkins, 1973, pp. 117-23~*for the slave trade)
and Curtin (1975, ch.4) - is that it blurs the crucial
distinction between production and exchange. For Fage this
has the implication that he fails to distinguishing systemati-
cally between slavery and the slave trade (despite the fact that
he is at pains to reject the view that the slave trade was an
important force in disseminating servile relations; and at one
point explicitly points to the problematic relationship between
mobilising slave labour and trading in slaves: but both are
seen simply as alternative, equivalent devices for securing
state power). Thus the close interrelationship between
slavery and state-formation becomes translated into a positive
contribution of the slave trade to the emergence of large-scale
political institutions.
In order to expand these critical observations on Fage's
approach into a more coherent overview of the problem I will
attempt to sketch the outlines of an alternative model of the
relationship between the slave trade and West African social
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development, starting from these various points of divergence.
Outlines of an Alternative Model
Broadly speaking, West African social formations prior to the
colonial era were based upon the articulation of one or more of
three distinct modes of production. On the one hand was the
lineage mode of production in which direct producers organised
through kinship based institutions were engaged primarily in
agricultural production and subjected to a more-or-less
exploitative appropriation of their surplus labour through the
lineage hierarchy of 'elders and 'young men1 and through the
sexual division of labour. Broadly parallel to Meillassoux's
1self-subsistent societies', this mode of production rested
upon a set of productive forces in which human labour and its
various forms of organisation were overwhelmingly predominant.
Secondly, there existed a widespread tributary mode in which
some form of central political structure acted as an appropri-
ative centre for surplus labour and product from the lineage-
based local units, as well as developing its own forms of
production, and often an urban or semi-urban form of organisa-
tion. A greater degree of the social division of labour
and the emergence of at least an embryonic non-agricultural
sector were the essential preconditions for this mode (hence
its close ties with trade and ecologically transitional zones);
however, the relatively parasitic appropriation of surplus from
the productive local communities tended to predominate (hence
its tendency to generate military-aristocratic formations).
Both these modes stimulated social inequality within the social
formations which rested upon them, and articulated with other,
embryonic, forms of exploitation. The essence of these was to
attach to the social 'core' of each mode - in the one case the
lineage in the other the state apparatus - additional human
resources in subordinate positions, thus "Enhancing the
exploitative capacity of the dominant social groups. The
variety of these relationships occupy the field that is commonly
designated as 'slavery1, but includes a spectrum of relation-
ships ranging from client-patron relations through pawnship to
something closely paralleling 'chattel slavery1. Moreover,
the position of slaves in each of the two modes is radically
different: in the lineage mode ranking among the exploited, in
the tributary mode as an auxiliary component of the exploiters.
This provides the basis for the emergence of a third mode of
production - a slave mode. This involves the emergence of a
genuinely distinct form of production and expropriation of
surplus out of the other two modes: in the one case, typically,
through the growth in the number of slaves and the splitting of
the community into 'aristocratic1 and 'slave' strata; in the
other through the creation of slave plantations or communities
subject to a particular relationship with the state structures.
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The complex variation of these modes, their interrelationship,
and differing combinations of domination and subordination
generate a wide range of social formations. And it is these
which provide the necessary 'context of West African history1
for an adequately-founded discussion of the impact of the slave
trade.
Within this framework, for example, the question of demography
becomes considerably clearer. The details of the number-
juggling become somewhat less significant than a rather simp]e
axiom: the removal of population by the slave trade meant that
West Africa had a smaller population than if they had not been
removed. As Fage and other commentators have observed, there
is no necessary relationship between population and economic
growth, citing the 19th. and 20th. century emigration from
Europe to North America. But this related to social formations
based upon the capitalist mode of production, in which economic
growth is the product of rising labour productivity stemming
from the accumulation of capital. If the substition of capital
for labour proceeds more rapidly than demographic shifts then
economic growth can proceed apace {indeed labour shortages
occasioned by migration may stimulate capital investment). In
the social formations of West Africa the underlying modes of
production depended upon unasr.isted human labour and its forms
of organisation; extended reproduction was coterminous with
demographic expansion. Even a relative slackening of the rate
of population growth would thus have a negative effect on
economic growth. The effects of the trade upon age and sex-
ratios would reinforce this effect.
Furthermore the pattern of slave appropriation could exercise
an inhibiting effect upon social development within the lineage-
based communities in a number of ways: the transfer of marginal
groups outside of the community through the salve trade would
reduce precisely those strata who were subject to the most
instense exploitation within the lineage mode and thus
furnished the greatest quantity of surplus product; the
enslavement of social malcontents as a mode of social control
within the lineage community would strengthen the dead-hand of
the elders and curtail the more dynamic elements possibly
capable of developing and extending new forms of production.
This raises another crucial point: the slave trade, as opposed
to slavery, could act as an inhibiting rather than a stimulating
factor in state-formation. Dissident 'young men' seem often to
have provided the inspiration for new commerical and political
ventures, and the intensification of community discipline over
them would most likely curtail such activities. If the trade
expanded commercial opportunities as well, then it would most
likely do so at the expense of political and productive
projects (the containment of Igbo political structures within
the Delta commercial city-states is suggestive of this) . More-
over, within already established social formations resting upon
the tributary mode the slave trade could unleash centrifugal
tendencies as power-groups competed for access to the new
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commercial opportunities and became detached from the central
political structures. Recent reinterpretations of Dahomey's
political development have highlighted this aspect: Catherine
Coquery-Vidrovitch has suggested that the kings of of Dahomey
genuinely wanted to supress the slave trade, but were unable
to do so becuase of the opposition of dignitaries involved in
the trade (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1975, pp. 111-12). A similar
situation would seem to have emerged in Angola and the Congo
(Miller, 1976).
One interesting illustration of the contradiction between
slavery and the slave trade is afforded by the case of the Vai.
Holsoe has pointed out that after the export of slaves from Vai
territory was terminated by British and American naval action it
was only women and children who were employed in domestic slave
production; male captives were executed, because there did not
exist the institutional framework necessary for their
regulation. In other words, the existence of the trade
provided an outlet for male captives which had made unnecessary
the development of the social superstructures appropriate to
the emergence of a slave mode of production.
More widely speaking, the social consequences of trade per sa
is highly ambiguous. It cannot be treated as an undifferen-
tiated stimulus to economic activity (as Fage, Curtin and
Hopkins do); but neither can it be regarded as marginal to
economic development- In so far as it serves as a stimulus to
productive activities, deepens the internal division ox7 labour,
or acts as a source for capital accumulation which can be
shifted into productive activities, trade can have revolutionary
consequences. But the overwhelming bias of the slave trade
would appear to lie in opposite direction: its own ramifica-
tions, in the productive sphere undid any potentially positive
impact it might have had, and its association with the military
oligarchies (whether of a centralised state or 'war lord'
variety) meant that profits realised on the trade tended to be
channelled into the ostentatious and redis*-ributive forms
characteristic of militarist social formations.
This generalisation needs some modification. The existence of
specific merchant communities involved in the trade enhanced the
potential for productive capital accumulation, although their
subordination to the military oligarchies checked the potential
of this strata. The relative facility with which much of
West Africa adjusted to the ending of the trade and the rise of
'legitimate commerce1 (see Klein, 1971) stresses the two sides
of this equation: the potential for trade to link up with
productive development was there, but it required the ending of
the slave trade to see its realisation.
Moreover, the opening up of trade between Africa, on the one
hand, and Europe and the New World, on the other, did not
centre exclusively on slaves, even though" the latter did
predominate. Philip Curtin1s figures for Senegambia show that
other commodities occupied a significant share of African
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exports throughout the period of the slave trade. Moreover
imports were more varied than is often suggested, with textiles,
iron, monetary objects (such as silver) outweighing firearms
and beads. Moreover it appears that the latter were often of
a high quality, and fed the development of a local jewellery
industry as well as playing a monetary function. (See Curtin,
1975, ch.8)
To this must be added a factor which, as Walter Rodney has
pointed out (Rodney, 1968), has largely gone unnoticed - the
development of a trade in foodstuffs designed to provision the
slaves and the crews of the slave ships both during their often
lengthy stays on the coast and through the 'Middle Passage1.
What this suggests is a closer relationship between the slave
trade and 'legitimate commerce1 than has generally been
recognised, and the necessity of looking further back in time
for some of the social consequences that have often been
ascribed to the emergence of the latter. Thus Walter Rodney
(Rodney, 1968) has offered an interpretation of the 18th.
century jihad in Futa Jallon that is very close to Martin Klein's
interpretation of similar movements in Senegambia a half century
later (Klein, 1972).
Despite these offsetting factors, the net effect of the slave
trade would appear to have been negative as regards the
development of productive activity and productive forces.
This conclusion is underlined by the fact that the emergence of
genuine slave modes of production seems to have gone furthest
in those social formations most removed from supplying the
Atlantic trade - Futa Jallon, the state network of the middle
Niger, and the Hausa states. The 19th. century jihad
movement, centred in these regions, would appear to have the
character of a political convulsion stemming from real social
developments: a phenomenon not really paralleled in the
coastal regions until after the transition to 'legitimate
commerce ' . •*»••
Some remarks should also be made about the importance of new
food crops that arrived in Africa from the new world. These
are either dismissed as of limjted significance (as in the
works we quoted at the beginning of this paper) or else
attributed arbitrarily with major demographic consequences
(Curtin, 1969, pp. 270-1). This is a question which cries out
for serious case studies. But it would be very foolish to
underestimate the impact of major new crops upon the level of
productivity of labour-intensive agricultural societies.
Eric Kerridge has demonstrated the immense impact that
relatively inconspicuous (and consequently disregarded)
agricultural innovations such as crop rotation, new crops, and
better methods of fertilisation, had upon 16th. century
England, even attributing much of England's later industrial
dynamism to this 'agricultural revolution'. The fact that the
new arrivals from America still make up major staple food items
in West Africa should suggest at least the possibility that a
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similar process might have taken place in West Africa in the
era of the slave trade. If this was the case its demographic
impact would seem to be the least important implication.
The point is, what has this really to do with the slave trade?
As Walter Rodney has pointed out, the dissemination of food
crops is one of the most pervasive of human phenomena (as
East Africa's borrowings from South-East Asia demonstrates) and
requires only a limited level of social contact (Rodney, 1972,
pp. 111-12). Even if Africa had not been a major supplier of
unfree labour to the new world, European interest in both the
Americas and Africa (and the vagaries of sail navigation) would
have been sufficient to allow the process of cultural diffusion
to take place.
Finally, the socially disruptive consequences of the trade have
to be assessed. Here Fage's view seems to be better founded
than that of his opponents. The social disruption that ensues
from slaving is more a function of the form that it takes than
of the numbers involved. Thus disparate raiding by specialised
slaving groups has much more disruptive consequences than the
activities of centralised states, employing methods of
judicial coercion, and the exaction of tribute from subject
peoples as well as more violent methods of enslavement. Even
organised warfare is probably less severe in its social
disruption - involving organised and mobilised forces and
following a regular seasonal pattern - than sporadic raiding.
This would seem to explain much of the difference between the
relatively contained impact of slavery in West Africa
(supported, as Fyfe has pointed out, by the evidence of
stability of West African language groups: Fyfe, 1976) in
contrast with the devastation in the.Centre and East.
Moreover, we have suggested that Fage is right about the
relationship between slavery and social development (although
wrong about the slave trade). Thus the only viable 'counter-
factual hypothesis' for West African development would rest
upon the development of extended domestio^slave modes of
production rather than slave exports. This would hardly have
involved less domestic violence, as the experience of the
Hausa states demonstrates, in the short to medium-term. What
it might have produced is the eventual stabilisation of larger
scale political institutions and a more effective resistance to
European colonisation (assuming of course that there was a
'Europe1 to do any colonising in the absence of African labour
to open up the Americas) .
To conclude, the balance sheet that we would offer of the
consequences of the slave trade is as follows:
1. it retarded West African economic development by
diminishing the dynamic effects of population growth and
reducing the potential sources of human labour essential
for such growth;
2. while opening up new commercial opportunities and sources
for capital accumulation in certain areas, it at least
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counter-balanced, and probably overshadowed these, by
acting to reinforce existing social institutions and
dominant social groups hostile to new forms of development
3. by attracting economic energy into commercial pursuits it
perpetuated, and even reinforced, the tendency for the
most powerful sector of West African social formations
(the state sector) to play a parasitic role divorced from
production and to dissipate wealth in redistributive and
ostentatious activities;
the slave trade thus inhibited the development of the slave
mode of production.
These hypotheses remain, however, on the theoretical level,
unsubstantiated by historical data. Only a much closer
inspection of the terms of the debate in the light of the
experience of concrete social formations can begin to bear out
their validity.
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